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Describing the literary character of the Talmud of Babylonia requires us 
to answer questions not of contents but of context: how does the document 
relate to prior writings of the same origin, namely, writings attributed to the 
sages of Judaism of the first seven centuries of the common era. In point of 
fact, we may without difficulty differentiate three types of writings: [ l] writing 
that is not shaped by documentary requirements, (2] writing that is not shaped 
by the documentary requirements of the compilations we now have, and also 
[3] writing that is entirely formed within the rules of the documents that now 
present that writing. That is, a given document exhibits definitive traits of 
rhetoric, logic of coherent discourse, and topical and even propositional 
program. A composition in said document that conforms to that definition 
as a matter of hypothesis may be assumed to have been written with that 
document in mind. A composition that is included in such a document but 
pursues its own program, idiosyncratic by the criterion of the document that 
contains it, but conforming to the protocol of some other document, was 
written with that other document in mind. An example would be, for 
example, a composition in Leviticus Rabbah that clearly follows the program 
and plan of Genesis Rabbah, or in Sifra that clearly follows those of the 
Mishnah. There are, in addition, extensive compositions and composites that 
find a natural place in no document we now have, e.g., collections of sayings 
attributed to, and stories about, named authorities, though we have no 
documents made up of collections of such materials formulated around 
individual sage's name or around sages as a group. A document that is made 
up principally of the first category of compositions and even composites, then, 
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may be said to constitute a document of integrity and cogency and then is to 
be read as such. And that brings us to the riddle of the Bavli. 
The first task in describing the Bavli is to ask whether or not the 
document is coherent and purposive, in which case we may indeed classify it 
as a document of integrity and cogency, one that makes a statement, or 
whether it is simply a conglomerate of free-standing traditions, with no 
program or viewpoint of its own. In the monographs surveyed in a prior 
article, "The Talmud of Babylonia: System or Tradition? A Reprise of Seven 
Monographs," 1 I summarized the research that led me to conclude the Bavli 
indeed forms a coherent statement of its own. 2 Moving beyond those results, 
in the six monographs summarized here I address two distinct problems. The 
first concerns the definition of what I conceive to form the Bavli's cogent 
statement. If the Bavli really constitutes a document of formal integrity, as 
I have already shown, then can I point to traits of substantive coherence as 
well? I conducted monographic experiments to yield data in response to that 
question in I) The Bavli's One Statement, 2)The Law Behind the Laws. The 
Bavli's Essential Discourse, and 3) The Bavli's Primary Discourse. Mishnah 
Commentary, its Rhetorical Paradigms and their Theological Implications in 
the Talmud of Babylonia Tractate Moed Qatan. The second question has 
concerned the Bavli's relationship to prior writings, both redacted in something 
like the form in which we know them, and also not redacted in any document 
we now have, but nonetheless available to us in clearly differentiated form. 
I want to know how the framers of the Bavli have utilized received writings. 
These monographs are 4) How the Bavli Shaped Rabbinic Discourse, 5) The 
Bavli's Massive Miscellanies. The Problem of Agglutinative Discourse in the 
·Talmud of Babylonia, and 6) Sources and Traditions. Types of Composition 
in the Talmud of Babylonia. For the convenience of colleagues interested in 
the problem I address but unlikely to work through the detailed monographs 
I have completed, I summarize the results I have reached on these two 
important questions. 
I. Hebrew Annual Review 13, 1991, pp. 89-106. 
2. Neusner 1987, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1990d, 199la, 199lb. 
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I. TOW A RD THE DEFINITION OF THE BA VL!'S ONE 
STATEMENT. FROM FORMAL COHERENCE TO SUBSTANTIVE 
COGENCY. 
1. The Bavli's One Statement. The Metapropositional Program of 
Babylonian Talmud Tractate Zebahim Chapters One and Five. Atlanta, 
1991: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. 
When a document says the same thing about many things, it presents not 
only propositions but a metaproposition, a substrate that frames the teleology 
of its recurrent propositions. Since in the prior set of seven monographs I 
proved that the Talmud of Babylonia, a.k.a. the Bavli, says a great many 
things in only a single manner, everywhere appealing to a severely restricted 
rhetorical repertoire that serves throughout, I here ask the question, how are 
we to know whether, in saying in one way a great many things, the 
document's authors propose also to say one thing about a great many things? 
At stake in the answer to that methodological question is the identification of 
the metapropositional statement implicit in an exceptionally diverse and 
intellectually prolix piece of writing. Once I have demonstrated how to 
identify the metapropositional program to which propositional inquiries 
repeatedly point and even suggested one of the main points of that program, 
I shall know how systematically to identify the Bavli's metapropositional 
program in a large sample of the whole. I dealt in this monograph with Bavli 
Zebahim Chapter Five. My results proved somewhat complicated, so I begin 
with an explanation of the context in which I read this Talmudic chapter. For 
at issue here is, when does a list become a series, or, in broader terms, how 
does static thought become dialectical? 
Static thought is represented by the taxonomic method of the Mishnah. 
The Mishnah portrays all things at rest, a beautifully composed set in stasis, 
a stage on which nothing happens. The Bavli portrays all things in motion, 
a world of action, in which one thing leads to some other, and nothing stands 
still. All of this is accomplished in a shift in the received mode of thought, 
and the shift is set forth in the metaproposition, fully exposed, in the Bavli's 
reading o.f two paragraphs of the Mishnah. We now consider what I conceive 
to be the counterpart program to the one that, in my view, the Bavli's sages 
inherited from the Mishnah and spelled out in tedious and unending 
particulars. To understand what is fresh and important in the Bavli's 
metapropositional program concerning the nature of thought, we have to call 
to mind what they inherited, for what they did was to impose the stamp of 
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their own intellect upon the intellectual heritage that the Mishnah had provided 
for them. The Mishnah teaches the age-old method of scientific thought 
through comparison and contrast. Like things follow like rules, unlike things, 
the opposite rules, and the task of thought is to show what is like something 
else and therefore follows the rule that governs that something else; or what 
is unlike something else and therefore follows the opposite of the rule that 
governs that something else. So the Mishnah's mode of thought establishes 
connections between and among things and does so, as is clear, through the 
method of taxonomy, comparison and contrast, list-making of like things, 
yielding the rule that governs all items on the list. 
With the Mishnah's position in hand, we revert to my claim that the 
Bavli's own statement in the Mishnah chapter under discussion concerns the 
nature of thought. Let me first summarize the results of my protracted 
analysis of Bavli Zebahim Chapter Five: 
1. it is important to know how to connect rules to Scripture; 
2. the principles that govern the making of connections to Scripture are 
those that dictate the manner of making connections not between 
words and words ("the hermeneutical principles") but rather between 
one thing and something else, that is, defining a genus and its 
species; so when we know how to compare and contrast, find what 
is like something else and what is different from something else, we 
know how to conduct the passage from rules to Scripture; 
3. exegetical rules tell us how to form classes of things in relationship 
to Scripture; 
4. dialectical rules tell us how to move from one class of things to 
another class of things. 
No. 2 then marks the point of departure, and Nos. 3 and 4, the remarkable 
shift in the passage. We go not only from rule to generalization, or from case 
to principle. That, to be sure, takes place and forms an everywhere-present 
metaproposition, as the tedium of the remainder of the chapter showed us. 
Rather, we go from thinking about things and their connections (comparison 
and contrast) to thinking about thought itself. So what I have represented as 
the rules of dialectical thinking - not merely argument! - tum out to tell us 
how thought happens; the Bavli's reading of Mishnah-tractate Zebahim 5: 1-2 
forms a fundamental exercise of thought about when a list become a series, 
or how thinking changes from a static to a dialectical mode. 
When we review the principal steps in the sustained and unfolding 
inquiry, we realize that, in particulars and in detail, the framers of the passage 
have set forth a profound essay on thought. In the terms just now given, if 
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A=B, and B=C, then does C=A? Is a series possible? Are there limits to the 
extension of a series? And on what basis do we construct a series? Do the 
media of linkage between A and B, that is, A=B, have to be the same as those 
that link B to C, for C to stand in the series that A has begun? These abstract 
questions have to become concrete before the sense of matters will emerge. 
So let us now review the sequence of points that represent the inquiry into the 
making of connections, which is to say, the Bavli's meta propositional 
statement on the character of a series. For it is the series, first this, then that, 
finally the third thing, and the rules that govern the movement from this, to 
that, to the third thing, that defines what is the center of deep thought in the 
Bavli's reading of the specified Mishnah-paragraphs. I cite the pertinent 
language, found at Bavli Zebahim 48a, reviewing what I give in detail in the 
monograph summarized here, and then provide my comments that specify 
what I conceive to be the metapropositional issues under discussion. The 
stages in the argument of the Talmud are marked by bold face capital letters. 
A. II.2.E. That answer is satisfactory for him who takes the view that one may 
indeed derive a rule governing a prior subject from one that is given later on, but from 
the perspective of him who denies that fact, what is to be said? 
The opening question contains the entirety of what is to follow: the 
conviction that anterior to conclusions and debates on fixed propositions is a 
premise, and the premise concerns not issues but thought itself. For what is 
before us is not a hermeneutical principle that guides the exegesis of Scripture, 
the movement from a rule back to a scriptural formulation deemed to pertain. 
It is a rule of how to think. And the issue is explicit: does thought flow, or 
does it stand still? Does it flow backward from conclusion to a conclusion 
already reached? In the context of the document at hand, the issue is one of 
arrangements of words, that is, a literary and therefore an exegetical question. 
That is, then, the proposition. But the metaproposition is otherwise, though 
that is not yet explicit. 
B. II.2.J. But this is the reason for the position of the rabbis, who declare one 
exempt [from having to present a suspensive guilt offering in the case of a matter of 
doubt regarding acts of sacrilege]: they derive a verbal analogy to a sin offering based 
on the appearance of the word 'commandments' with reference to both matters. 
N. They take the view that one may not derive from an argument by analogy 
established through the use of a word in common only a limited repertoire of 
conclusions. Rather, once the analogy is drawn, then all of the traits of one case apply 
to the other. 
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Here is an issue not of exegesis, therefore of hermeneutics, but of the 
rules of right thinking: thinking about thought. And what it concerns, as I 
have suggested in context, is how we establish not classes of things but 
linkage between and among classes of things. Let me state the centerpiece in 
simple words but with heavy emphasis: since I make connections through 
analogy and contrast, mtry I proceed to make connections beyond the limits 
of the original connection? And the answer is, I must proceed, because 
thought does not come to rest. Comparison and contrast yield connections, 
which then govern. 
In the language before us, once I draw an analogy, do all traits of the two 
classes of things that have been linked through analogy - of necessity only 
partial, since were the analogy entire, both classes would constitute a single 
class! - pertain to each class? In the present context, what we establish is 
the anonymous, therefore the governing rule. The norm is that once we draw 
an analogy, the connection established by the (mere) analogy takes over, so 
that we treat as analogous traits not covered by the analogy at all. The 
analogy establishes the connection; but then the movement of thought is such 
that the connection is deemed to have established a new class of things, all of 
them subject to one rule. The movement - the dialectic - therefore is not 
a mere trait of argument, "if you say this, I say that," but a trait of thought: 
if this is the result of step A, then step B is to be taken - out from, without 
regard to, the limitations of step A. Thought then is continuous, always in 
motion, and that metaproposition states in the most abstract terms possible the 
prior and generative metaproposition that, when we compare classes of things, 
the comparison initiates a process that transcends the limits of comparison. 
That is to say, again with emphasis, we can effect a series. 
C. II.2.S. One authority maintains that proof supplied by analogy [here: the 
analogy sustained by the use of "and" to join the two subjects] takes priority, and the 
other party maintains that the proof supplied by the demonstration of a totality of 
congruence among salient traits takes precedence. [Rabbis prefer the latter, Aqiba the 
fonner position.] 
T. Not at all! All parties concur that proof supplied by analogy [here: the 
analogy sustained by the use of "and" to join the two subjects] takes priority. But 
rabbis in this context will say to you that the rule governing the subject treated below 
derives from the rule governing the subject treated above, so that the guilt offering must 
be worth a least two silver sheqels. This is established so that you should not argue 
that the doubt cannot be more stringent than the matter of certainty, and just as where 
there is certainty of having committed a sin, one has to present a sin offering that may 
be worth even so little as a sixth of a zuz in value, so if there is a matter of doubt, the 
guilt offei;;ing worth only a sixth of a zuz would suffice. 
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Once the connection is made, linking an earlier rule (in Scripture's orderly 
exposition) to a later one, then the connection is such that movement is not 
only forward but backward. We have established not a connection between 
one thing and something else, but a series that can encompass a third thing 
and a fourth thing, onward - but with, or without, formal limit? This 
principle of right thinking that the hypothesis of the series requires is revealed 
by Scripture, as is made explicit once more in the following: 
D. 111.1.r. ... And should you say that if Scripture had not included the matter, we 
should have reached the same conclusion by argument for analogy, then if that is the 
case, we can infer by analogy also the rule on laying on of hands... [The main point 
here is that, once an analogy serves, it serves everywhere an analogy can be drawn; 
there is no a priori that limits the power of an analogy to govern all like cases]. 
A series is possible once the work of thought moves beyond contrast and 
analogy. And it is the rule of right thought that, once we have established a 
comparison and a contrast, that fact validates drawing conclusions on other 
aspects of the classes of things that have been connected through the 
comparison and contrast - analogical-contrastive thinking is then not static 
but in motion. Is the motion perpetual? Not at all, for Scripture, for its part, 
has the power to place limits on a series. 
E. IV.2.B. If a matter was covered by an encompassing rule but then was singled 
out for some innovative purpose, you have not got the right to restore the matter to the 
rubric of the encompassing rule unless Scripture itself explicitly does so. [That means 
that the encompassing rule does not apply to an item that Scripture, for its own 
purposes, has singled out. The upshot is that the identified item is now exceptional in 
some aspect, so it is no longer subject to a common rule governing all other items in 
context; then the limits of analogy are set by Scripture's treatment of the items of a 
series. It is worth while reviewing the pertinent example:] 
The series is subjected to limits, if an item in the sequence of connections 
that forms the series proves exceptional: this is connected to that, that to the_ 
other thing, but the other thing is other in some other way, so there the series 
ends. 
The upshot is simple: I have two items, A and B. I claim that B is like 
A, therefore the rule governing A applies also to B. Now I tum forward, to 
C. C is not analogous to A; there are no points of congruence or (in the 
exegetical formulation that our authors use) verbal intersection. But C is like 
B. It is like B because there is an analogy by reason of verbal intersection 
(the same word being used in reference to C and B.) The question is, may I 
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apply to C, by reason of the verbal intersection between C and B, the lesson 
that I have learned in regard to B only by reason of B's similarity by reason 
of congruence, not verbal intersection, to A? Can a conclusion that is derived 
on the basis of a verbal analogy go and impart a lesson by reason of analogy 
to a third item? Raba now maintains that that is not the case. But the matter 
has gone in the other direction: a series is possible. But if a series is possible, 
then what limits are to be placed on the media by which a series is effected? 
G. lV.5.A. Now it is a fact that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal 
analogy does in tum go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy, 
demonstrated whether in the manner of Raba or in the manner of Rabina 
Now we revert to our basic issue: the validity of a series. Here we move 
into as yet unexplored ground, which is the basis for my claim that the order 
of problems is dictated by an interest in a systematic presentation of the rules 
of right thinking. We have been exposed to the case in favor of a series: once 
the analogy makes the connection, then all traits of the things connected are 
brought into relationship with all other such traits. Scripture then provides 
one limit to the length of a series: a series cannot be infinite. But there is 
another limit proposed, and it is not scriptural but substantive, in the nature 
of things, a trait of thought itself. Here is the point at which I find this 
sustained exposition of thinking about thought simply remarkable. 
B. Is it the rule, however, that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal 
analogy may in tum go and impart a lesson by means of an argument on the basis of 
congruence.? [Freedman: Thus the law stated in A is applied to B by analogy. Can that 
law then be applied to C because of congruence between B and C?] 
We have proven one point. It bears a consequence. We go on to the 
consequence. The mode of thought is dialectical not only in form, but also 
in substance: if A, then B. If B, then what about C? It is one thing to have 
shown that if B is like A, and C, unlike A, is rendered comparable to B by a 
verbal analogy. But then may I take the next step and draw into the 
framework of B and C, joined by verbal analogy and assigned a common rule 
by B's congruent-analogy to A, also D, E, F, and G, that is, other classes of 
things joined to C by verbal analogy - but not necessarily the same verbal 
analogy that has joined C to B? That indeed is the obvious next step to be 
taken, and it is now taken. It is taken in the simple words just now given, and 
the same point is now going to be made, in a systematic way, for each 
medium by whi12!i classes of things are formed and then connected to one 
another. Analogical contrastive thinking therefore is not static but always in 
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motion, since, once a connection is made, other connections made follow. If 
we make a connection between A and B on the basis of one set of shared 
traits, we may proceed to make a connection between C and A, via B, on the 
basis of traits shared by B and C but not by A and C. Not only so, but the 
same mode of thought extends to the media of connection. If I connect A to 
B by verbal analogy, I may connect B to other classes of things, e.g., C, D, 
by other media of connection: verbal analogy connects A to B, and an 
argument based on congruence connects B to C, and backward to A; and an 
argument a fortiori may connect C to D, and backward to A and B - series 
without end, or series that end only in the dictates of revelation, the ultimate 
arbiter of the classification and hierarchy of all things. What is truly 
impressive in what follows is the rigorous order by which each possibility is 
raised in its turn, the connections fore and aft, such that the framer of the 
whole not only makes his point in words, but also illustrates it in his own 
representation of matters: a series is not only possible, it is also compelling. 
At stake throughout is the question of how a series is composed: the 
media for the making of connections between one thing and something else 
(that is, one class of things and some other class of things, in such wise that 
the rules governing the one are shown by the analogy to govern the other as 
well). We want to know not only that a connection is made, but how it is 
made. And some maintain that if the connection is made between one thing 
and something else by means, e.g., of a verbal analogy dictated by Scripture's 
wording, then a connection between that something else and a third thing must 
also be made in a manner consistent with the initial medium of connection, 
verbal analogy. It cannot be made by means of some other medium of 
connection. But the paramount position is otherwise: dialectics affect not only 
argument but thought itself, because connections are made through all media 
by which connections are made. 
So to conclude this brief summary: the metapropositional program 
contributed by the Bavli's framers concerns how series are made, which is to 
say, whether connections yield static or dynamic results, or, at the deepest 
layers of intellect, how thought happens. Now, at the end, we ask the framers 
of the Mishnah to address the question before us. And in answer, they give 
us silence. So we know that here we hear what is distinctive to, and the 
remarkable discovery of, the authorship of the Bavli. Since, it is clear, that 
discovery has taken place within the words of the written Torah, and, since 
their deepest metaproposition maintained that the words of the written Torah 
are the words of God to Moses, our rabbi, at Sinai, - the words, not just the 
gist - we have to conclude with what I conceive to be the bed-rock of the 
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metapropositional program before us: the Torah teaches us not only what God 
said, but how God thinks. When we understand the Torah rightly, we engage 
in thinking about thought. And that is how we know God: through thought. 
So Spinoza was not so heretical after all. 
2. The Law Behind the Laws. The Bavli's Essential Discourse. 
Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of 
Judaism. 
The logically consequent question is whether, underneath the detailed 
discussions is a subtext: a set of laws that yields principles, holding together 
a great many more laws. The Talmud transcends its origins when it speaks 
beyond the limits of cases and rules and frames discrete rules, pertinent to 
particular examples, in broad and universal laws. Where, in the Bavli, we 
occasionally find a sequence of unrelated cases or examples, with a single rule 
deemed to be pertinent to them all, or with all of them held to demonstrate one 
fact that transcends the details of any one, then we confront an exercise in 
discovering the law beyond the laws. Even though, in the Bavli, these 
exercises are not numerous and form no preponderant part of any tractate, not 
even making an appearance in some tractates, they constitute, nonetheless, a 
distinct and important component of the intellectual repertoire and structure of 
the document. This monograph presents the passages in the Bavli that ask 
questions of generalization and conclusion, making the effort to form the 
detailed and the arcane into propositions of general intelligibility and universal 
relevance. These passages attract attention because they both contribute to the 
exposition of the Mishnah and also transform Mishnah-exegesis from a text-
bound and limited exposition into an intellectually engaging inquiry that stands 
on its own and forms of passages of the Mishnah a composite of a 
transcendent order. 
My inquiry is not complicated; I want only to show that in its quest for 
the law behind the laws, the Bavli accomplishes what I claim in its behalf: a 
discourse essential to itself, different from that of the framers of the Mishnah 
and from that of exegetes of the Mishnah. I want to know what these 
discourses look like, and quite honestly I want to place on display as many of 
them as I can, to show in detail what I conceive to be a critical and definitive 
trait of the document as a whole. So I surveyed, for nineteen tractates, essays 
in the presentation of the law behind the law. These composites, ordinarily 
crafted with skill and wit, rarely leave any doubt as to their character and 
purpose. I call them the essential discourse of the Bavli for a very simple 
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reason. If we want to know how the Bavli speaks in its own name, and not 
merely in the name of the authors out of the past whose writings it proposes 
to clarify or, even, merely preserve in tact, it is in these composites that they 
will deliver their message. 
THE LAW BEHIND THE LAWS: IS IT PERMITTED TO TAKE THE 
LAW rNTO ONE'S OWN HANDS? 
To exemplify the character of discourse that strikes me as not-exegetical, 
but rather abstract, theoretical, and propositional in a sustained way - that is, 
the discourse I deem essential to the Bavli and indicative of its intellectual 
might - I present the case that drew my attention to the need to learn more 
about the kind of writing under discussion here. This is the item that 
concluded Sources and Traditions, discussed below. The passage directly 
continues the one just now cited and serves the next clause of the same 
Mishnah-paragraph. The issue comes up somewhat abruptly, at B. B.Q. 27b-
28a, in the context of the detailed exposition of the rule at hand. But once the 
issue is framed, it takes over, and from there to the end, it remains the same. 
It is to be framed as a debate: 
[I) A man does not have the right to take the law into 
his own hands 
versus 
[2] A man has the right to take the law into his own 
hands where there will be an irreparable loss. 
At that point, a set of cases will be examined, to uncover what law is implicit 
in the laws at hand. I should claim that, while the Mishnah-commentary is 
helpful, the sustained debate before us is interesting, and, without what 
follows, the Bavli would be merely a collection of lessons, rather than a 
composite of important conclusions, capable of governing in situations to 
which the laws of the Mishnah would prove monumentally irrelevant. 
F. R. Judah said, ''.A man does not have the right to take the law into his own 
hands." 
G. R. Nahman said, "A man has the right to take the law into his own hands 
where there will be a loss." 
H. Now all panies concur that where there will be a loss, someone may take 
the law into his own hands. Where there is an argument, it concerns a case in which 
there will be no loss. R. Judah said, ''.A man does not have the right to take the law 
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into his own hcmds." Since there will be no loss, he ccm go to court. But R. Nahmcm 
said, ''.A mcm has the right to take the law into his own hcmds where there will be a 
loss." Since he is acting in accord with the law cmyhow, why take the trouble to go 
to court.? 
I. Objected R. Kahcma [to R. Judah's view], "Ben Bag Bag says, 'A pelllon 
should not go and retrieve his own property from the household of someone else, lest 
he appear to be a thief. But he should be ready In public to break his teeth and you 
may say to him, "I am seizing what is my own from the thief's possession'" [T. B.Q. 
10:38]." [This then would contradict Judah's position.] 
J. [Judah] said to him, (28A] 'True enough, Ben Bag Bag is on your side. But 
he is a dissenting view, differing from rabbis." 
K. R. Y cmnai said, "What is the mecming, cmyhow, of break his teeth? It is, 
in court." 
L. If so, the lcmguage, you may say to him, is inappropnate. Rather it should 
be, they [the court] may say to him! So too, the lcmguage, I am seizing what is my 
own is inappropriate, Rather, it should be, he is seizing what is his own] 
M. So that's a problem. 
N. Come cmd take note: in the case of an ox that climbed up on another one 
to kill it, and the owner of the one on the bottom came along and pulled out his ox, so 
that the one on the top fell and was killed - the owner of the bottom ox is exempt 
from having to pay compensation. Does this ruling not pertain to cm ox that was cm 
attested dcmger, in which case there is no loss to be expected? 
0. No, it speaks of an ox that was deemed innocent, and there is a considerable 
loss to be expected. 
P. If so, then look what's coming: Ifhe pulled off the ox on top and it died, 
he is liable to pay compensation. But if the ox was deemed innocent, why should he 
have to pay compensation? 
Q. Because he should have pulled his ox out from underneath, and he did not 
do that. [Kirzner: he had no right to push the ox on top.] 
R. Come cmd take note: He who filled the courtyard of his fellow with jugs of 
wine and jugs of oil - the owner of the courtyard has every right to break the jugs in 
order to get out or break the jugs in order to get in. 
S. Said R. Nahman bar Isaac, "He breaks the jugs to get out only if a court says 
he may do so, he may break the jugs to get in only to get whatever documents he needs 
to prove his case in court." 
T. Come cmd take note: How on the basis of Scripture do we know that in the 
case of a slave whose ear had been bored [indicating that he was in perpetual service, 
to the Jubilee year], whose term of service has come to an end [with the Jubilee], whose 
owner has been urging him to leave, and, in the process, injured him and done him 
damage, the owner is exempt from having to pay compensation? Scripture states, "You 
shall not take satisfaction for him who is ... come again ... " (Num. 35:12), meaning, for 
one who is determined to come again [as a slave, continuing his service], you will not 
take a ransom. , 
U. Here with what sort of a case do we deal? It is a slave who was a thief 
[Kirzner: so the owner is protecting himself from a genuine loss]. 
V. Well, up to now he hasn't stolen cmything, but now he's expected to go cmd 
steal? 
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W. Yes, that's quite plausible, since up to now he was qfraid of his master, but 
now that he is about to go free, he isn't qfraid of his master anymore. 
X. R. Nahinan bar Isaac said, "At issue is a slave to whom his master gave a 
Canaanite serving girl as a wife. Up to this time it was a legitimate relationship, but 
once he is freed, it is not legitimate" [Kirzner: so the master may use force to eject 
him]. 
Y. Come and take note: He who )eaves a jug in the public domain, and 
someone else came along and stmnbled on it and broke it- (the one who broke itJ ls 
exempt So the operative consideration is that he stumbled on it. Lo, if he had 
deliberately broken it, he would have been liable. [This is contrary to Nahinan's view.] 
Z. Said R. Zebid in the name ofRaba, "In point of fact, the same rule really 
does apply even if the defendant deliberately broke the jug. And the reason that the 
language, and stmnbled on It is used, is that the later clause goes on to SC()', And if [the 
one who broke ltl was lnjun!d by It, the owner of the burel ls liable [to pay damages 
forj his lnjwy. But that would be the case only if he sfumbled on it, but not if he 
deliberately broke the ;ug. How come? The man has deliberately injured himself. So 
that is why, to begin with, the word-choice was and sfumbled on It 
AA. Come and take note: "Then you shall cut off her hand" (Dt. 25:12) - that 
refers to a monetary fine equivalent in value to the hand. Does this not speak of a case 
in which the woman has no other way of saving her husband but doing what she did 
(proving one may not take the law into one's own hands]? 
BB. No, it involves a case in which she can save her husband in some other way. 
CC. Well, if she cannot save her husband in some other way, would she be free 
of all liability? Then why go on to SC(Y, "And pu1s forth her hand" (Dt. 25:11) -
excluding an officer of the court [from liability for humiliation that he may cause when 
acting in behalf of the court)? Rather, why not recast matters by dealing with the case 
at hand, thus: Under what circumstances? When she can save her husband by some 
other means. But if she cannot save him by some other means, then she is exempt. 
DD. This is the sense of the passage: Under what circumstances? When she can 
save her husband by some other means. But if she cannot save him by some other 
means, then her hand serves as the agency of the court and she is indeed exempt. 
EE. Come and take note: He who had a public way passing throngh his fteld, 
and who took It away and :ave [the public another path) along the side, what he has 
pven he has :fven. But what L~ his does not pass to him [M B.B. 6:7 A-DJ. Now if 
you maintain that someone mC(Y take the law into his own hands, then let the man just 
take a whip and sit there [and keep people out of his property I' 
FF. Said R. Zebid in the name of Raba, "It is a precautionary decree, lest he 
assign to the public a crooked path." 
00. R. Mesharshayya said, "It is a case in which he gives them a crooked path." 
HH. R. Ashi said, "Any path that is over off to the sign is classified as a crooked 
path to begin with, since what is nearer for one party will be farther for another." 
II. If that's so, then why specify, But what Is his does not pass to hbn? Why 
can't he just SC(Y to the public, "Take what is yours and give me what is mine?" 
JJ. That is because of what R. Judah said, for said R. Judah, "A path that the 
public has taken over is not to be disrupted." 
KK. Come and take note: a householder who designated peah at one comer of 
the field, and the poor come along and take the peah from another side of the field 
both this and that are classified as peah. Now if you maintain that a person mC(Y take 
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the law into his own hands, why should it be the fact that both this and that are so 
classified.? Just let the man take a whip and sit there [and keep people out of his 
property}! 
LL. Said Raba, "What is the meaning of the phrase, both this and that are so 
classified? It is for the purpose of exempting the designated produce from the 
requirement of separating tithes. For so it has been taught on T annaite authority: He 
who declares his vineyard to be ownerless and then gets up early in the morning and 
harvests the grapes is liable to leave for the poor the grapes that fall to the ground, the 
puny bunches, the forgotten ones, and the corner of the field, but is exempt from having 
to designate tithes." 
The rather ambitious, free-standing composition is inserted only because 
the framer has drawn upon our Mishnah's rule as part of his repertoire of cases 
and evidence. It could have appeared more or less anywhere without any 
alteration of its character, since what we have is a propositional essay on a 
problem of broad intelligibility and more than narrowly episodic interest. It 
is at 4.D that the real point of debate takes over. We see that the issue is 
tangential to the exegetical problem, but critical in its own terms. It is further 
noteworthy that the issue is specified in a free-standing debate, set forth at 
4.E-G. The sequence of cases moves toward the illustration of arguments one 
might propose, but, the Bavli being what it is, we shall work through cases 
that illustrate arguments, precedents that constitute facts to be addressed and 
held together in equilibrium, not arguments framed in a philosophical manner. 
Our cases emerge at 4.I, N, R, T, Y, AA, EE, KK. The Mishnah-paragraph 
before us is cited in the context of the debate, at Z. It is not distinguished in 
this context, and the formation of the whole goes forward entirely within the 
terms of the broadest nature; we never lose sight of what is at issue. Our 
eight cases, spread across the face of the laws of the Mishnah, are shown to 
address a single problem, and any eight other cases, far beyond the details of 
the Mishnah's law, can have served with equal effect. Now to answer specific 
questions that the foregoing analysis of concrete texts has settled. 
IS THE BA VLI MUCH MORE THAN A MISHNAH-COMMENTARY? 
No, the Bavli is not much more than a Mishnah-commentary. The paramount 
purpose of Mishnah-exegesis was realized in these inquiries into the law 
behind the laws. What is other than Mishnah-exegesis, rhetorically and 
topically, forms only a portion of the whole. What is other than Mishnah-
exegesis, if not topically (for that is, by definition, excluded from this type of 
writing, which is not topical at all) is balanced, even in analytical proposition, 
by what merely carries forward an inquiry begun in the Mishnah itself. 
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IS THE BAVLI A WRITING THAT IS SYSTEMATIC OR (MERELY) 
AGGLUTINATIVE? 
The Bavli is a systematic wntmg, occasionally using composites drawn 
together by principles of agglutination that do not in general govern in the 
Bavli, but then ordering these agglutinative composites entirely in accord with 
the Bavli's own program of Mishnah-commentary. 
HOW RICH A CORPUS OF SOURCES IN THE BA VLI'S 
TRADITIONS? 
The Bavli utilizes available sources, but among them was not a set of 
inquiries, worked out on their own terms and within their own framework, into 
the law behind the law. There is no question that, here and there, work on 
that interesting question was undertaken; but this was mainly, though not 
exclusively, in the framework of Mishnah-commentary, and nearly always 
expressed within the rhetorical framework established by a prior program of 
Mishnah-commentary. My initial expectation was that, through routine 
procedures of literary analysis, I could show that there was a "layer" of the 
Bavli, however thin, made up of a distinctive and essential discourse of an-
other-than exegetical kind: writing that served an entirely distinct purpose 
from that that defined the structure and system of the Bavli overall. But the 
opposite result is now before us. The essential discourse comprising an 
inquiry into the law behind the laws is not a distinct source, whether early, 
whether late, upon which the framers of the Bavli drew; it is a discourse that 
is essential in a different, unanticipated sense altogether. It is essential to the 
exegetical purpose of the framers of the Bavli, in some few contexts, to move 
quite beyond their exegetical frame of reference. But when they chose to do 
so, they in no way differentiated in the signs of rhetoric that writing from any 
other. All proves uniform; all is set forth as essential in its context. 
3. The Bavli's Primary Discourse. Mishnah Commentary, its Rhetorical. 
Paradigms and their Theological. lmplicaJions in the Tai.mud of 
Babylonia TractaJe Moed QaJan. Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for 
South Florida Studies in the Histoiy of Judaism 
The result of this monograph is simple, repeating results attained on 
different bases altogether: the Bavli in form and substance presents a 
commentary to the Mishnah, and, to markedly lesser degree, Scripture as well. 
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From 80% to 99% of the composites of the tractates of the Bavli -
depending on the tractate focus upon the work of Mishnah-exegesis. So 
the next task is to catalogue the types of exegetical compositions and 
composites that accomplish the paramount goal of explaining the sense and 
meaning of the Mishnah. In this monograph I treat in particular the manner 
in which the Talmud of Babylonia proposes, in Bavli-tractate Moed Qatan, to 
read Mishnah-tractate Moed Qatan. Defining in detail what the sages of the 
Bavli did, and how they did it, imparts immediacy and concreteness to the 
general deseription of their writing as "a commentary to the Mishnah." Not 
only so, but by showing how most of the Bavli's composites, as well as the 
larger part of the composites formed into those composites, form a 
commentary to the Mishnah or a secondary expansion of commentary to the 
Mishnah, I provide in highly graphic form a clear picture of the structure of 
the document as a commentary, covering also secondary elaboration of its own 
commentaries. 
For the most part, the Talmud of Babylonia is a commentary to the 
Mishnah. Let me start by giving a simple example of what characterizes the 
initial phase of nearly every sustained composite of the Bavli: a commentary 
to the Mishnah. This is what I mean by Mishnah-comrnentary: 
Mishnah-Tmctate Baba Qamma 3:1 
A. He who leaves a jug in the public domain, 
B. and someone else came along and sCmnbled on it and broke it -
C (the one who broke it) Is exempL 
D. And if (the one who broke it) was injured by it, the owner or the balrel Is 
liable (to pay damages roij his injmy. 
Lt A How come the framer of the pavsage refers to begin with to a jug but then 
concludes with reference to a balrel? And so too we have learned in another pavsage 
in the M ishnah: This one comes along with his balrel, and that one comes along with 
his beam- (if) the jarorthi.s one was broken by the beam or that one, [the owner or 
the beam) Is exempt. How come the framer of the pavsage refers to begin with to a 
balrel but then concludes with reference to a jug? And so too we have learned in the 
Mishnah: This one Is coming along with his balrel or wine, and Chat one Is coming 
along with his jug or honey the jug or honey cracked, and this one poured out his 
wine and saved the honey In his jar- he has a claim only ror his wages [M B.Q. 
10:4A-EJ. How come the framer of the pavsage refers to begin with to a balrel but 
then concludes with reference to a jug.? 
B. Said R. Hisda, "Well, as a matter of fact, there really is no difference 
between a jar and a barrel.' 
C. So what is the practical difference between the usages? 
D. It has to do with buying and selling. 
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E. How can we imagine such a case? If it is in a place in which a;ug is not 
called a barrel, nor a barrel a jug, for in such a case, the two terms are kept distinct! 
F. The distinction is required fora place in which most of the people call a jug 
a jug and a barrel a barrel, but some call a barrel a jug and some call a jug a barrel. 
What might you then have supposed? That we follow the majority usage? [27B) So 
we are informed that that is not the case, for in disputes over monetary transactions, 
we do not follow the majority usage. 
All that we have here is an investigation of the linguistic properties of the 
Mishnah-paragraph that is cited. The framer of the anonymous writing notes 
that a variety of other passages seem to vary word choices in a somewhat odd 
way. The point of insistence - the document is carefully drafted, the writers 
do not forget what they were talking about, so when they change words in the 
middle of a stream of thought, it is purposeful - constitutes an exegetical 
point, pure and simple. 
To understand precisely what the Bavli means by a commentary to the 
Mishnah, we have therefore to begin with a simple recognition: the Bavli asks 
the questions of not only the teacher, standing inside of the document and 
looking outward, but also of the reader, located outside of the document and 
looking inward. In what follows, then, the stance of the commentator now is 
external to the text, and the commentator wants to know why the Mishnah 
finds self-evident what is not necessarily obvious to all parties: 
1:7-8/Ll A. So if it's an occasion of rejoicing forthe groom, what's so bad about 
that? 
B. Said R. Judah said Samuel, and so said R. Eleazar said R. Oshaia, and some 
say, said R. Eleazar said R. Han in a, "The consideration is that one occasion of rejoicing 
should not be joined with another such occasion." 
C. Rabbah bar R. Huna said, "It is because he neglects the rejoicing of the 
festival to engage in rejoicing over his wife." 
D. Said Abbayye to R. Joseph, "This statement that has been said by Rabbah 
bar R. Huna belongs to Rab, for said R. Daniel bar Qattina said Rab, 'How on the basis 
of Scripture do we know that people may not take wives on the intermediate days of 
the festival? As it is said, "You shall rejoice in your feast" (Dt. 16:14), meaning, in 
your feast - not in your new wife."' 
E. Ulla said, "It is because it is excess trouble." 
F. R. Isaac Nappaha said, "It is because one will neglect the requirement of 
being fruitful and multiplying" I if people postponed weddings until festivals, they might 
somehow diminish the occasion for procreation, which is the first obligation]." 
G. An objection was raised: All those of whom they have said that they are 
forbidden to wed on the festival [9A) are permitted to wed on the eve of the festival. 
Now this poses a problem to the explanations of all the cited authorities I 
H. There is no problem from the perspective of him who has said, "The 
consideration is that one occasion of rejoicing should not be joined with another such 
occasion," for the main rejoicing of the wedding is only a single day. 
176 JACOB NEUSNER 
I. And from the penpective of him who has said, "It is because it is excess 
trouble," the principal bother lasts only one day. 
J. And from the penpective of him who has said, "It is because one will 
neglect the requirement of being fruitful and multiplying," form erely one day someone 
will not postpone the obligation for any considerable length of time. 
What is important in understanding the nature of commentary in the Bavli is 
the dual stance of the commentator: inside and outside. 
Now to generalize on the basis of the cases before us: what I mean by a 
commentary is a piece of writing that depends for its program - topics to be 
treated, coherence and cogency, alike - upon some other writing. We know 
the difference between a base-text and a commentary because the base-text 
will be cogent in its own terms, and the commentary will make sense only in 
relationship to the base-text. And we know the difference between the one 
and the other because a commentary's author will always signal the text, e.g., 
by citing a phrase or by a clear allusion, and will further identify what he then 
proposes to contribute. Commentaries may take a variety of forms, but the 
mark of them all will be the same: they make sense only by appeal to, in the 
context of, some piece of writing outside of themselves. But that common 
trait among them all scarcely exhausts the program that a commentary will 
undertake - or even define it. One type of commentary will follow a quite 
well-defined program of questions, another will promiscuously comment on 
this, that, and the other thing, without ever suggesting that the commentator 
has a systematic inquiry in mind. And, it goes without saying, the range of 
issues subject to comment - philological, historical, aesthetic, not to mention 
theological - can be limited only by the number of texts deemed by an 
·author or compiler to deserve a commentary. 
"Primary discourse," it is now clear, refers to the main lines of expression 
of a coherent document. When the Bavli's authorship, having cited a passage 
of the Mishnah, begins its statement, it always begins with attention to the 
cited passage. When further materials, not those of Mishnah-commentary 
follow, these relate to the initial discussion. So while many compositions, and 
even some very large composites, take shape in their own terms and stand 
independent of the Mishnah, when they find a place in the Bavli, it is 
ordinarily in the framework of Mishnah-commentary, very often as a 
secondary expansion of what is set forth to begin with for the exegesis of what 
is in the Mishnah. The material that we have examined leaves no doubt about 
the coherence of nearly everything in the Bavli. Materials that do not cohere 
either with Mishnah-exegesis, or with secondary amplification of that exegesis, 
prove sparse indeed. When we recall that sizable components of the Bavli -
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numerous compositions - stand on their own and not as Mishnah-
commentary, we realize how much the authorship of the Ba vii has done in 
reframing matters to serve its distinctive purpose: nearly everything that they 
utilized, they presented in the framework of Mishnah-commentary and 
amplification. Briefly to summarize my results: here are the types of 
Mishnah-commentary that, over all, form the Bavli's primary discourse. 
1. SCRIPTURAL FOUND A TIO NS OF THE LAWS OF THE 
MISHNAH 
The single most commonplace and characteristic inquiry of the Bavli is 
framed in the question: what is the source of the rule of the Mishnah? 
Conventionally, this inquiry occurs in simple language, e.g., "What is the 
source of this rule," always with the implication, "in Scripture"? 
2. AUTHORITIES BEHIND THE LAWS OF THE MISHNAH 
A primary exegetical question concerns whether or not a law stands for 
an individual's opinion or a consensus of sages. The inquiry takes a variety 
of forms. The simplest is, "Who is the authority behind the Mishnah's 
[anonymous] rule?" This allows us to find out whether we have a schismatic 
(individual) or normative (consensual) opinion; we may further ask whether 
the cited authority is consistent, testing the principle behind the rule at hand 
against the evidence of his rulings in other cases in which the same principle 
determines matters. 
3. MEANINGS OF WORDS AND PHRASES 
We come to Mishnah-commentary of the most conventional kind: 
explanation of the meanings of words and phrases of the Mishnah, appealing 
for scriptural parallels to set forth lexical evidence, on the one side, inquiry 
into the sense and meaning of sentences of the Mishnah, on the other. 
4. TEXT-CRITICISM. THE ISSUE OF REPETITION 
The matter of text-criticism covers a variety of distinct inquiries. In the 
first sort, we want to know why the Mishnah frames matters as it does, with 
the generative issue being whether or not the document repeats itself. The 
type of Mishnah-commentary is signalled by a single word, "it is necessary," 
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and what will follow is an implicit justification of presenting more than a 
single rule or case. This form is not limited to Mishnah-criticism; on the 
contrary, it is commonly used for any formulation - Tannaite or other - of 
a variety of cases that illustrate the same principle, and the form, brief though 
it is, suitably sets forth the exegetical problem to be solved. Another kind of 
text-criticism involves the explanation of how a variety of examples hold 
together; the Mishnah may present three or more examples, and what we want 
to know is whether a stringency or leniency is conveyed by setting forth 
examples that do not really cohere. 
5. CONFLICT OF PRINCIPLES IMPLICIT IN THE MISHNAH'S 
RULES 
One important issue in the Bavli's Mishnah-commentary is whether or not 
two rules, intersecting in detail or in fundamental principle, cohere. A 
sustained effort characterizes the Bavli's inquiry into the harmony of the law 
of the Mishnah, the object of which invariably is to demonstrate that the 
Mishnah's laws form a single, wholly cogent law, perfect in their harmony. 
6. EXECUTION OF THE LAW OF THE MISHNAH 
At stake is where and how the simple rule of the Mishnah pertains; a 
Tannaite formulation of the same conclusion then reenforces the proposed 
reading of the Mishnah's rule. 
7. THE OPERATIVE CONSIDERATION BEHIND THE LAW OF THE 
MISHNAH 
One of the exegetically-productive initiatives of the Bavli will raise the 
question of the operative consideration that has led to a given rule in the 
Mishnah. That inquiry will lead us deep into the principles that are given 
expression in concrete rules, and we often see how entirely abstract 
conceptions are conceived to stand behind rather commonplace laws. 
8. THE IMPLICATIONS, FOR THE LAW IN GENERAL, OF THE 
MISHNAH'S PARTICULAR FORMULATION 
Here what generates the sustained discussion of the Talmud is a close 
reading of the Mishnah's language. This careful analysis produces an 
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inference that has to be investigated in its own terms. Since there is no 
understanding the sustained discussion apart from the Mishnah's own 
statement, the entire composition falls into the classification of Mishnah-
comrnentary. Another mode of commentary, in the inquiry into the 
implications of the Mishnah's rule for law in general, involves presenting a 
theoretical possibility that is subject to confirmation, or refutation, by a 
statement of a Mishnah-paragraph. That theorizing in response to a rule of the 
Mishnah then explores the implications of a rule of the Mishnah. 
9. SETTLING THE POINT SUBJECT TO DISPUTE IN THE 
MISHNAH 
While not a principal focus of exegetical interest, some attention is given 
to settling the dispute presented in the Mishnah by a statement of the decided 
law. 
If, therefore, we had to state in a single sentence the exegetical 
proposition, indeed the hermeneutical principle, that animates the Bavli's 
reading of the Mishnah, - another way of expressing what I earlier called its 
metapropositional program - it may be stated very simply: the Mishnah is a 
supernatural writing, because it can be shown to be flawless in its language 
and formulation, never repetitious, never slovenly in any detail, always and 
everywhere the model of perfection in word and thought; the Mishnah is 
moreover utterly rational in its principles; and of course, the Mishnah is 
wholly formed upon the solid foundations of the written Torah of Sinai. No 
merely human being can have achieved such perfection of language and of 
thought in conformity with the Torah. That is the point made, over and over 
again, in the Bavli's primary discourse. 
IL THE BA VLI IN CONTEXT: THE CONTEXTUAL 
UNIQUENESS OF THE TALMUD IN RELATIONSHIP TO 
OTHER WRITINGS IN ITS CANON 
The second of the two sets of monographs turns to the question of 
context. What I learned here is that the Bavli really did impose its own 
judgment upon the entire antecedent canon, which its authorship(s) knew and 
utilized for their own purposes. Specifically, the Bavli is only one talmud 
a sustained analytical criticism, through applied logic and practical reason, of 
a received document; it is a talmud to the Mishnah. But, as a matter of 
demonstrable fact, other documents, reaching closure prior to the Bavli, were 
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subjected to talmud-analysis along precisely the same lines characteristic of 
the Bavli's talmud to the Mishnah. But what the Bavli did was unique, in that 
only the Mishnah was subjected to a sustained, systematic, and comprehensive 
talmud: the Bavli's (and Yerushalmi's) polemic argued for the priority, indeed 
the privileging, of the Mishnah. Here I show there could have been other 
talmuds, serving Sifra for one instance (the one I summarize here), among 
various other composites ofTannaite statements, and that shows how the Bavli 
(and the Yerushalmi) imposed their judgment upon judgments made by others 
on the centrality of the Mishnah, its uniqueness.3 
4. How the Bavli Shaped Rabbinic Discourse. Adanta, 1991: Scholars Press 
for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. 
Sometime between the closure of the Talmud of the Land of Israel, ca. 
400, and the conclusion of the Talmud of Babylonia, ca. 600, talmud, a 
common noun that can connote the rigorous and systematic, critical analysis 
of a received document of Tannaite standing in the canon of the Judaism of 
the dual Torah, became a proper noun, The Talmud. The Talmud was a 
composite of critical analysis organized around, and focused solely upon, the 
Mishnah. There would be two Talmuds, the Talmud of the Land of Israel, the 
Talmud of Babylonia, both of them limited, for purposes of structure and 
organization, in focus to the Mishnah. Other writings accorded Tannaite 
standing could have had talmuds and did enjoy that critical dialectical reading 
that the Mishnah did. But only the Mishnah was privileged to receive the 
Talmud, and all other Tannaite writings were denied the talmuds that had 
accumulated around them during the centuries from ca. 200 through ca. 600. 
Viewed from the perspective of the redactional program of the Ba vii, these 
other analytical-critical readings of documents other than the Mishnah served 
no purpose that the Bavli's ultimate redactors defined for themselves in their 
sustained reading of the Bavli and their episodic and rather sparse reading of 
all other writings. But those readings did serve those other documents, and 
in the sherds and remnants in our hands, we can see how a rigorous and 
systematic reading of those other writings was being written even while the 
Bavli's materials came forth. On redactional grounds, then, I maintain that the 
Bavli contains compositions and even composites that reached closure under 
3. That opens the question of how the Bavli relates to the Y erushalmi. I have answered that 
question in two projeets, Neusner l993a, and 1993b. 
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auspices separate from the Bavli's. I further insist that it was the framers of 
the Bavli that dictated the shape of rabbinic discourse - not only for the 
future, but, more to the point, retrospectively as well: this but not that. 
When the reading of the Mishnah that yielded our Talmud was under way, 
other documents, or materials of the same status Tannaite as the 
Mishnah, also were being read along the same lines. But those other talmuds 
never reached us, and although the Bavli contains ample indication that such 
talmuds could have come into being, it also contains no evidence that, in any 
sustained way, they did. Once we realize that ours is not the only Talmud 
that was under way from the closure of the Mishnah to the conclusion of the 
Bavli, 200-600, we then grasp how profoundly the framers of the Talmud of 
Babylonia reshaped all prior discourse, since, as I show in this monograph, 
they made certain that there would be only one talmud, the Talmud, and only 
one privileged document entitled to such a talmud, namely, the Mishnah. 
Accordingly, the compositors of the Bavli, or the Talmud of Babylonia 
preserve evidence that, just as the Talmud of Babylonia was worked out as an 
analysis and critique of the Mishnah, so other documents were subjected to the 
same kind of critical analysis. These compositors provide us with important 
samples of the written result of that analysis. 
What we now shall see is a single example of how the analysis, in the 
Bavli, of a passage in the Sifra follows precisely the same rhetorical and 
logical rules that govern the analysis in the Bavli of a passage of the Mishnah. 
The way Mishnah-commentary was conducted in the Bavli is the same way 
that the same work was done in Sifra. It would seem to me that the 
prevalence of the same literary conventions in the reading of two distinct 
documents, each with its own indicative traits, strongly suggests the work was 
done more or less within the same period of literary formulation and among 
people responsive to the same conventions of analysis. Then a further fact 
will prove exceedingly suggestive. It is that the analysis of the Sifra's passage 
proceeds wholly in terms required by that passage and ignores the setting, 
within the composite of the Bavli, in which the Sifra's passage has be·en 
preserved. That seems to me to mean that the framers of the commentary on. 
the Sifra's passage had in mind a document that would be devoted to not the 
Mishnah but Sifra. Then the framers of the critical analysis of the Sifra's 
materials proposed to produce a commentary to the Sifra, parallel to what was 
being accomplished for the Mishnah. But that commentary to the Sifra, that 
is, that talmud to Sifra, did not survive, except in bits and pieces in the Bavli 
itself. 
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Here we see how the Sifra's materials are articulated in relationship to the 
Mishnah, namely, in a first-class example of how the treatment of the Sifra's 
passage will highlight what the Sifra wishes to show, not what the Bavli's 
frame of a Mishnah-commentary cites the Sifra's passage to prove; the two 
propositions are complementary, but they are distinct Then the further 
discussion of the passage at hand concerns not what is proved by the Sifra that 
is relevant to the Mishnah, but what is proved by the Sifra in terms important 
to its own framers. The distinction here is critical. The one passage wants to 
know how come "[From] the meal offering of a priest who was a sinner [Lev. 
7: 16], the handful is taken I even though the whole of it in any case is offered 
on the altar], and the handful is offered by itself, and the residue [thereof] is 
offered by itself.'' The Sifra's author is going to prove that "the performance 
of the meal-offering rite of a priest [who has inadvertently sinned] is assigned 
to that priest [so that he may perform his own rite and retain possession of the 
residue of the meal offering that he himself has presented)." That is, then, a 
talmud to the Sifra, not to the Mishnah. That proves my point, that the Sifra, 
as much as the Mishnah, not only can have had, but in fact did have, a talmud 
of its own: 
IV.1 A R. Simeon says, '1Fmm) ttie meal offering or a priest who was a sinner 
!Lev. 7:16), ttie handl\d is taken [even though ttie whole orttln any case is offered on 
ttie altwj, and ttie handl\d is offered by Itself, and the residue [lhereofJ is offered by 
itself:" 
8. What is the scriptural basis for this position? 
C. It is in line with that which our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: 
D. "lt shall belm11 to ttie priest, like ttie meal offering" (Lev. 5:13) 
E. The meaning is that ttie peJfonnance or ttie meal-offering rite or a priest 
(who has inadvertently slnnetl) is assiped to that priest [so that he may peJfonn his 
own rite and refaln possession or ttie residue or ttie meal offering that he himself has 
presented). 
F. Or might the Intent not be to declare pennltted [to ttie priesthood the residue) 
orttie tenth ephah orftne Oourthat has been brought by a priest? ICashdan: the verse 
then tells us that a priest's obligatory meal offering is like the meal offering of an 
Israelite that is eaten by the priests after the handful has been taken out.] 
G. How then shall I interpret the statement, "Eveiy meal offering or a priest 
shall be whoUy burned, It shall not be eaten" (Lev. 6:23/Heb.: 6:16)? 
R This then would referto a meal offering that ttie priest has brought as a free 
will offering, and as to the tenth ephah that he has presented, that may be eateii.. 
L But (contrary to that Une or argument) Scripture states. "lt shall befong to 
the priest, like ttie meal offering:" 
J. lo, It is in ttie sbdus or ttie meal offering that he presents as a free will 
offering, with ttie result that just as the free will offering of meal that he presents does 
not yield -!due that may be eaten, so ttie tenth ephah of ftne Oour that he presents 
may not be eaten. 
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K. Said R. Simeon, "And ls it written, 'and it shall be the priest's as his meal 
offering'? What it says is, 'It shall belong to the priest, likr the meal offering:' 
L [73B] '10, the tenth ephah of tine flour that a priest has brought ls In the 
classification of the tenth ephah of ftne flour that an lsmeUte presenls. 
M. "Just as the tenth ephah of ftne flour that an lsmellte presents yields a 
handful, so a handful ls taken up from this offering as welL 
N. "But might one then say, just as the handful is taken from the meal offering 
presented by the poor sinner who is an Israelite, and the remainder may be eaten, so 
when the handful is taken from the poor sinner's meal offering presented by a priest, 
the residue may be eaten? 
0. "Scripture states, 'the priest's as the meal offering:' in what regards the priest, 
it is like the meal offering of a sinner who is of the Israelite caste, but in respect to 
what concerns the fire on the altar, it is not like that meal offering. 
P, "fhe handful that ls taken up ls presented by llself, and the residue is 
presented by ilselr' (Slfm LXllL16), 
2. A. But is the rule that the rites of the priest's meal offering may be camed out 
by the pnest drawn from that exposition? Surely it derives from the following: 
B. How on the basis of Scripture do we know that a priest may come to present 
his offerings at any occasion and at any time that he wants? 
C. Scripture states, "And come with all the desire of his soul...and minister" (Dt. 
18:6). 
D. Had I derived the ruling from that verse, I might have supposed that 
reference is made to something that is not presented by reavon of sin, but a. to 
something that 1s presented by rea.on of sin, I might have said that that is not the ca.e. 
3. A. But is the rule that the rites of the priest's meal offenng may be carried out 
by the priest drawn from that exposition? Surely it denves from the following: 
B. "And the priest shall make atonement for the soul that errs, when he sins 
through error" (Num. 15:28) - this teaches that a priest may make atonement for 
himself through his own act of service. 
C. Had I derived the ruling from that verse, Im ight have supposed that that rule 
pertains only to offerings that are prt!sented for a sin committed in error, but not for 
offerings presented fora sin committed deliberately; so we are informed that that is the 
crue a. well. 
D. So are there really offenngs that are prosented for sins committed 
deliberately? 
E. Yes: deliberately taking a false oath [Lev. 5:1]. 
In the material at hand, a passage of the Sifra is introduced to prove a rule set 
forth in the Mishnah rests on Scriptural foundations. But what that passage 
proves is distinct, though related: not that the handful of the meal offering of 
a priest who has sinned is burned on the altar, along with the residue, but that 
the priest may present his own meal offering under the specific circumstances. 
Then No. 2 raises a question pertinent not to the issue that has required the 
framer of No. l to introduce the abstract of the Sifra, but to the passage of the 
Sifra itself. And No. 3 goes forward along the same lines. That is important, 
because the now-run-on quality of the composite is entirely routine in the 
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Bavli; here we see that precisely the principles of agglutination that govern in 
the Bavli's exposition of the Mishnah are in place in the exposition of the 
Sifra's claims. Two simple facts follow: 
1) The way in which the framers of the Bavli read the Mishnah is the way 
in which the framers of passages, in the Bavli, on the Sifra read the Sifra. 
2) Passages in the Sifra that are subjected to exegesis may be read not for 
purposes of Mishnah-exegesis but for purposes of Sifra-exegesis. 
The upshot is simple: whether the classification of writing be given a 
temporal or merely taxonomic valence, the issue is the same: have these 
writers of talmuds done their work with documentary considerations in mind? 
That is, have they shaped their exegetical method to respond to the unique 
qualities of the distinct documents that they are treating? I believe I have 
shown that they have not. Three conclusions follow: 
1) Because the modes of thought and analysis concerning the Sifra, the 
Tosefta, and the baraita-corpus in no way diverged from those that guided 
inquiry into the Mishnah, I claim that the work that was done falls into the 
category of talmud, as defined earlier. 
2) And because some of these passages are sustained, I allege that, in 
addition to The Talmud, the one that imposes meaning upon the Mishnah, 
there not only can have been, but almost certainly were, other talmuds, in 
progress for the Sifra, the Tosefta, and components of the baraita-compositions 
and even compilations. 
3) Where a talmud was taking shape around the Tosefta, the Talmud to 
the Mishnah would consist of the Tosefta's talmud, itself amplified and revised 
in relationship to the Mishnah's statements, thus, Mishnah-paragraph, Tosefta-
amplification through restatement, in the Mishnah's language, of what the 
Mishnah was supposed to mean, and, third, further analysis of the Tosefta's 
judgment of the Mishnah's meaning and the Mishnah's unresolved issues. 
The framers of the Bavli took control of, and closed off, prior discourse. 
They not only chose what would form the systemic statement that defined 
what we should call "Judaism" and what their apologists would call "the one 
whole Torah of Moses, our rabbi." They also privileged one document of 
choice, making its exegesis critical, and set in the background other documents 
that in earlier times, were subjected to exactly the same engaged exegesis as 
the Mishnah had long enjoyed. Alongside the Talmuds to the Mishnah (the 
Yerushalmi and the Bavli as we know them), there might have been a variety 
of talmuds - the talmud to Sifra, the talmud to Tosefta; the Talmud that we 
do have, had it emerged only as a secondary development of the talmud to 
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Tosefta, might have been a very different document from what it is. But that 
is not what we have. 
5. The Bavli's Massive Miscellanies. The Problem of Agglutinalive 
Discourse in the Tai.mud of Babylonia. Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for 
South Florida Studies in the History of JudaisDL 
Two conflicting characteristics mark the Bavli. It is, first, a disciplined 
and well-organized, carefully crafted piece of writing. Most of the document 
is formulated in accord with a few simple rules, so that it is well-organized 
and easily followed. The Bavli, viewed whole, is carefully set forth as a 
commentary to the Mishnah, and the vast majority of its composites are put 
together so as to elucidate the statements of the Mishnah. But in the pages of 
the Bavli we observe, second, very large composites, not formed into 
Mishnah-commentaries at all. These composites do not follow the rules that 
govern the formation of the composites that serve as commentaries to the 
Mishnah. Whoever put the miscellanies together had a different program in 
mind. And if the framers of the miscellanies had in mind that they ultimately 
would be collected in a piece of writing of some dimensions, then that writing 
that the imagined bears no resemblance to the writing in which their 
miscellanies did end up, that is, the Bavli. 
The Talmud of Babylonia therefore makes use of two distinct principles 
for the formation of large-scale composites of distinct compositions. 
Ordinarily, its framers brought together distinct and free-standing compositions 
in the service of Mishnah-exegesis and amplification of law originating in a 
Mishnah-paragraph under analysis. For that purpose they would then draw 
upon already-written compositions, which would be adduced as cases, 
statements of principles, fully-exposed analyses, inclusive of debate and 
argument, in the service of that analysis. So all of the compositions in a given 
composite would serve the governing analytical or propositional purpose of the 
framer of the composite. Where a composition appears to shade over into a 
direction of its own, that very quickly is seen to serve as a footnote or even 
an appendix to the composite at hand. Clear, governing, and entirely 
predictable principles allow us to explain how one composition is joined to 
another. Ordinarily, a sizable miscellany will tell us more about a subject that 
the Mishnah addresses or richly illustrate a principle that the Mishnah means 
to set forth through its cases and examples. In that sense, the miscellaneous 
kind of composite is set forth as Mishnah-commentary of a particular kind. 
An agglutinative composite may be formed by appeal to a common theme, 
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ordinarily stated by the Mishnah or at least suggested by its contents, and 
several closely-related themes will then come under exposition in a massive 
miscellany. One common theme will be a passage of Scripture, systematically 
examined. A subordinate principle of agglutination will join composites 
attributed to the same authority or tradent, though it would be unusual for the 
compositions so joined to deal with entirely unrelated topics. So the principal 
point of differentiation between propositional composites and agglutinative 
ones is that the former analyze a problem, the latter illustrate a theme or even 
a proposition. 
What then accounts for the large-scale "miscellanies"? Quite random 
compositions, each with its own focus, will be formed into a composite on the 
basis of one of three theories of linkage: [I) topic, [2] attribution, or [3] 
sequence of verses of a passage of Scripture. The agglutination of topically-
coherent compositions predominates. And this leads to a further theory on the 
miscellany. The conglomerates of random compositions formed into topical 
composites ordinarily serve as an amplification of a topic treated in the 
Mishnah, or are joined to a composite that serves in that way, so that, over all, 
the miscellanies are made to extend and amplify the statements of the 
Mishnah, as much as, though in a different way from, the commonplace 
propositional, analytical, and syllogistic composite. What appears to be a 
random hodgepodge of this and that and the other thing in fact forms a 
considered and even crafted composite, the agglutinative principles of which 
we may readily discern. In fact what we have in the miscellany is nothing 
more than a Mishnah-commentary of a peculiar sort, itself extended and spun 
out, as the more conventional Mishnah-commentaries of the Bavli tend to be 
extended and spun out This kind of commentary collects and arranges 
information deemed relevant to the topic of the Mishnah-paragraph under 
discussion, not analyzing but illustrating that topic. What appears to be odd, 
incoherent, pointless, rambling, to the contrary attests in its own way to the 
single and definitive program of the Bavli's framers. Whatever those framers 
wished to say on their own account they insisted on setting forth within the 
framework of that received document upon the structure of which they made 
everything to depend. 
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6. Sources and Traditions. Types of Composition in the Talmud of 
Babylonia. Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the 
History of Judaism 
For the title of this monograph I have taken an excellent distinction 
proposed by David W. Halivni in his Hebrew work of the same title, namely, 
Meqorot ummessorot, in English translated by him as Sources and Traditions. 
This means, [I] sources as materials utilized by an authorship from what was 
ready made, as against [2) materials framed by that authorship on their own 
account. Halivni had a very good idea for a scholarly project, but he executed 
it incompetently. The reason is that his entire analysis, beginning to end, rests 
on complete credulity: what is assigned to a given name really was said by 
that person, where and when he lived; there is not a trace of critical acumen 
in Halivni's work. For he begins his analysis of the Bavli with radically 
isolated bits and pieces, phrases and sentences assigned to individual names, 
taken out of context; I begin mine with the Bavli as a whole and I work back 
from the whole to the parts, stage by stage. Either his approach is right, or 
mine is, but both cannot be correct, and, it must follow, either his results or 
mine must in the end win the field. Since his approach takes for granted that 
what is assigned to a given authority really was said by him (or by someone 
in the period in which he lived who bore the same name), and since my 
approach is formed in response to the critical program of contemporary critical 
learning, which denies prima facie validity to attributions in the absence of 
evidence that a named authority really said what he is supposed to have said, 
my approach will prevail. But his distinction between traditions and sources 
stimulated me to some interesting inquiries. 
To explain: "the sources" of the Ba vii are those completed, available, and 
free-standing pieces of writing that the authors of the Bavli used when they 
wrote their book. "The traditions" of the Bavli are those composites and 
sustained discussions that the authors of the Bavli set forth in their writing. 
What I want to know is a simple matter. Upon what kinds of material did the 
framers of the Bavli draw when, having done their own kind of writing, which 
was Mishnah-commentary, analysis, expansion, and amplification, they filled 
out their document? For as a matter of simple fact, they augmented their main 
writing, Mishnah-commentary, with a different kind of writing altogether. 
That other kind of writing is so distinct from the sort that served for their 
principal purpose that it demands attention in its own terms. When we know 
what kinds of writing, other than those that formed the stuff of the document 
and quite different therefrom, were utilized in the framing of the Bavli, we 
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shall know something about the sources, prepared, to be sure, under auspices 
we cannot identify, for purposes we do not know, and at a time we cannot 
determine, that ultimately flowed into the foundation-document of Judaism. 
It is the simple fact, shown by me in various monographs, that the 
authorship of the Bavli takes over a substantial heritage and reworks the whole 
into its own sustained and internally cogent statement - and that forms not the 
outcome of a process of sedimentary tradition but the opposite: systematic 
statement of a cogent and logical order, made up in its authorship's rhetoric, 
attaining comprehensibility through the syntax of its authorship's logic, 
reviewing a received topical program in terms of the problematic and interests 
defined by its authorship's larger purposes and proposed message. The 
samples of the Bavli I have reviewed constitute either composites of sustained, 
essentially syllogistic discourse, in which case they form the whole and 
comprehensive statement of a system, or increments of exegetical 
accumulation, in which case they constitute restatements, with minor 
improvements, of a continuous tradition. 
But this brings us to the matter of "sources" - available writings, utilized 
but not made up - upon which the authorship of the Bavli drew for its own 
purposes. In fact the authorship of the Bavli made use of sources, both 
completed documents, and also sayings and stories, ordinarily of modest 
proportions. We know about the latter because these received and completed 
compositions, sayings or sets of sayings and stories alike, were not subjected 
to ultimate redaction. That fact is shown by a very simple criterion: does this 
composition in all its details serve the purpose of the framers who have 
adduced it in evidence for their purposes? The answer is invariably, rarely in 
many details, never in all. In fact the received sources are given pretty much 
in a form quite independent of the purpose for which, in the Bavli, they are 
adduced in evidence. True, the authorship of the Bavli did whatever it wished 
with these materials to carry out its own program and to make its own 
prevailing statement. Where relevant to the purposes of the framers of the 
Bavli, these received materials were undeniably formulated and transmitted in 
a process of tradition. Indeed, they have been so reworked and revised by the 
penultimate and ultimate authorship that their original character has been 
obscured. But, then, we can identify many other such writings that were not 
only not reformulated but indeed not reshaped in such a way as to win for 
themselves a clear and cogent position in the passage in which they now 
appear. These latter kinds of compositions in no way define for the Bavli the 
syntax of argument and the processes of syllogistic discourse; all they do is 
supply facts for someone else's case. That is why in the instances of the 
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compositions irrelevant to the thrust and flow of the Bavli's argument, we can 
still discern traces of received statements or sources. 
That fact has now to be set into contrast with the view of many, that the 
Bavli supposedly draws upon and reshapes available ideas and reworks them 
into a definitive statement, hence turns sources into a tradition. The kind of 
material I analyzed in this monograph contradicts that view, since what we see 
is writing that has not been reworked at all. Let me specify the kinds of 
factual information that will permit me to frame a reply to the question before 
us. If I want to know criteria for authority, I have to ask about the 
relationship between a document and prior treatments of the topic of said 
document. For one critical criterion of continuity - of forming a tradition out 
of available sources - is the capacity to take in, hold together, and rework 
the entirety of a prior corpus of information, writing, on a given subject The 
literary test of traditionality is whether or not the canonical statement has 
drawn together and reworked in a cogent way whatever lay to hand in prior 
wntmgs. If the test proves affirmative, then we may propose as one 
substantial and necessary criterion for traditionality a particular relationship to 
the entirety of prior writing. If it proves negative, then the entire literary 
dimension of the problem of traditionality turns out to weigh the wind, 
measure what has no weight. A different approach to the criteria by which the 
entirety of the literature of Judaism forms a single canonical statement will 
require invention and exploration. 
My survey of four tractates, documented in this monograph, yielded a 
small number of "sources," compositions developed in response to a program 
of writing, and even compilation, entirely out of phase with that of the Bavli, 
but upon which the framers of the Bavli clearly have drawn. I find these 
types and no others: 
l. A sustained reading of sequential verses of Scripture 
2. Stories about sages 
3. Eposidic exposition of individual verses 
4. Proof of a proposition in no way relevant to the Mishnah or Mishnah-
exeges1s 
The authorship of the Bavli was engaged by its own concerns, ordinarily 
using what it has received without extensively incorporating all received 
materials into its own literary framework at all. So I think that there really 
were "sources" prior to, and in clear distinction from, the tradition that the 
Bavli's framers set forth. That the Bavli's authorship had access to these four 
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classes of writing indicates that other kinds of documents and types of writing 
were underway besides theirs. People wrote compositions that can have been 
collected, e.g., in lives of sages, or in collections of Midrash-compilations (in 
addition to the handful that we have in hand). Whatever the Bavli's writers 
picked or choose beyond their primary foci makes slight impact upon the 
document as a whole. So I think that the framers of the Bavli drew upon a 
variety of sources in the formation of their tradition. Most of these appear to 
have been trivial and to have played no important part in the shaping of the 
document. But, when, having done their own kind of writing, which was 
Mishnah-commentary, analysis, expansion, and amplification, the framers of 
the Ba vii filled out their document, it was with one kind of writing that vastly 
expanded the document, turning the exegesis of the Mishnah into something 
larger and more elegant than a commentary: an essay on the law behind the 
laws. The authorship of the Bavli augmented their main writing, Mishnah-
commentary, with a different kind of writing altogether. That other kind of 
writing is so distinct from the sort that served for their principal purpose that 
it demands attention in its own terms. We now know what kinds of writing, 
other than those that formed the stuff of the document and quite different 
therefrom, were utilized in the framing of the Bavli. These I identify and 
analyze in The Bavli's Massive Miscellanies. The Problem of Agglutinative 
Discourse in the Talmud of Babylonia (1992) - but that is another story. 
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